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The present paper is an attempt to examine, in a comparative fashion, the series of 
demands and claims the Romanian state, as a candidate-state, had to deal with in 
the sphere of minority rights observance, protection and promotion, in the period 
prior to the EU accession (1998-2006). The study is based on extensive document 
analysis of two sets of documentation: (1) the European Commission’s annual reg-
ular reports on Romania’s progress towards accession in the period 1998-2006, and 
(2) the documentation (i.e. statute, programs, governmental agreements, internal 
resolutions, etc.), adopted by the main, most active, political organization repre-
senting the interests and demands of the Hungarian minority, the RMDSz/UDMR. 
The paper employs the observations previously drawn by Edina Szöcsik and Peter 
Vermeersch, on the development recorded by the states of East-Central Europe in 
the field of minority rights, under the auspices of the European Commission in the 
pre-accession period. From the documents’ analysis, the study concludes that a sig-
nificant discrepancy between the claims and demands expressed by the RMDSz/
UDMR for its constituency, and the recommendations issued by the European Com-
mission through the monitoring reports, is conspicuous and can only be further ex-
plained through the circumstances and political changes specific to each of the years 
under scrutiny. Generally, the Commission appears vague and ambiguous in this 
sphere, probably due to the lack of well-established and well-founded standards. 
Keywords: minority rights protection, monitoring report, European Commission, 
RMDSz/UDMR, Venice Commission, cultural autonomy, mother tongue, educa-
tion, territorial autonomy, decentralization
Accession to the European Union has always exerted a particularly powerful trigger 
in redefining, reshaping, and – more often than not – in actually drafting legislation 
and policy lines in the field of national minorities’ rights observance, protection, and 
promotion. This is especially so in the periods prior accession when the influence 
and the pressures are politically exercised through the so-called “Copenhagen Cri-
teria” and through its resulting reports, issued annually and designed to undertake 
tasks monitoring and supervising the candidate state’s progress, improvements in 
accommodating its own legal framework and socio-political realities to the “Euro-
pean standard” of consolidated democracy and a working free market-economy. The 
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S protection and observance of the minority rights in the candidate states has been en-
visaged as part and parcel of the broader field of human rights protection. As a matter 
of fact, throughout the processes of transition and democratization in the countries 
of former Sovietized Europe, the topic of minority rights observance, protection and 
promotion has been consistently on the post-communist governments’ agenda and, 
consequently, it has been gradually strengthened. The tremendous role played by the 
European Union’s Copenhagen Criteria in this realm in the countries of East-Central 
Europe appears incontestable, although, it will be emphasized here, the relevance and 
the contents of the monitoring reports have been politically manipulated. The present 
paper also attempts to examine the actual extent in which the annual reports of the 
European Commission constituted a basis for policy-making and policy-reshaping 
for the Romanian governments of the 1998-2006 period; hence, this paper’s ques-
tion revolves around the evaluation of the triggers and pressures represented by the 
EC reports on Romanian factors of decision-making in the sphere of minority rights 
protection. This assessment is further compared to the series of demands advanced 
by the main minority political organization, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in 
Romania (RMDSZ/UDMR), as illustrated in this organization’s official documenta-
tion (from party programmes, party statutes and other type of acts concerning the 
organization). The main question of the present study refers to the extent to which the 
EU conditionality, as depicted in the annual reports on the candidate state’s progress, 
actually responds to the minority parties’ demands and grievances, in the period un-
der scrutiny.    
Countless and quite compelling studies have been conducted in the field of the 
impact and influence of the EU conditionality with respect to the protection, ob-
servance, and promotion of minority rights. This pressure on the candidate-states is 
particularly powerful for the countries of East-Central Europe and Sovietized Europe, 
countries that faced identity problems, nationalism, and multiple deviations in the 
realm of minority groups even before their inception in the 19th century and after the 
Paris Peace Treaty of 1918-1919. A series of observations can be summarized from 
the research undertaken thus far: (1) the actual effectiveness of the EU conditionality, 
expressed in the annual reports monitoring the progress of the candidate-states, is 
severely questioned, for, as in any stringent areas – e.g. the common foreign and se-
curity policy, the fiscal policy, etc. –, there is no commonly agreed upon and shared 
set of standards in the field of minority protections within the EU; (2) the “acquis 
communitaire” does not refer to a common standard (of course, besides the principle 
of non-discrimination), making recourse instead to the standards established by the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and those of the Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE). Under EU conditionality, the very definition and operation-
alization of the concept of “national minority”, and the items to be protected under 
the umbrella of “minority rights” still constitute open questions, prone to vigorous 
debates, particularly vague and unclear, open to loose, often contradictory, interpre-
tation. (Both old, e.g. France, and new member-states, e.g. Bulgaria, do not even rec-
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ognize the idea of “national minority”; others define their states as “national” ones.) 
(3) Quite often, EU conditionality, while frequently employing double-standard prac-
tices, proves inconsistency and incoherence in its approximate application and im-
plementation among the candidate states. The renowned American historian Rogers 
Brubaker totally overlooks the impact of the international or supranational organiza-
tions in the dynamics of ethno-political relations: such relations are the exclusive do-
main of the said minority group, the host state and the kin state, with no mentioning 
of such structures as EU, OSCE, or CoE. Although, constant scholarly concerns have 
been raised in respect to the European Commission’s action in the realm of minority 
rights protection for the states caught in the process of EU accession, it should be 
remembered that EU monitoring can be doubled by scrutiny internally performed 
and strong advocacy constantly sustained by the ethnic parties within the candidate 
states. The analysis of such a joint effort represents part of the objective of this paper, 
while the main objective is constituted by the evaluation of the extent in which the 
ethnic party’s demands correspond to or are actually doubled by the European Com-
mission’s monitoring and conditionality on Romania. 
Conceptual Framework
Probably one of the most compelling categorization of ethnic parties in the European 
context pertains to Protsyk and Garaz1 who differentiate parties according to their 
position on the “integrationist – multicultural” continuum: closer to an “integration-
ist position”, one can encounter ethnic parties which are negative (codified 1) or neu-
tral (codified 2) on multiculturalism; at the opposite pole, one finds a multitude of 
parties that are positive on multiculturalism: (1) those seeking identity preservation 
(codified 3), (2) those advocating for political representation (codified 4), (3) those 
whose paramount interest is territorial autonomy (codified 5), and (4) those few, rath-
er anti-systemic2, anti-national, extreme parties embracing the desideratum of push-
ing for a new constituent nation within the existing stately setting (codified 6). Quite 
similarly, Jenne3 conceptualizes the ethnic parties on a resembling continuum, that of 
“inside of state framework – outside of state framework”, distinguishing among: (1) 
parties of “affirmative action” (codified 1), (2) parties of “cultural autonomy” (codified 
2), (3) parties of “territorial autonomy” (codified 3), and the only species of parties 
outside the state framework, (4) parties of “secession or irredentism”, anti-national 
ones. Far from the danger of “ethnification” of the party systems, stressed among oth-
1 Oleh PROTSYK and Stela GARAZ, “Politicization of Ethnicity in Party Manifestos”, in Party Poli-
tics, Vol. 19, No. 2 (March 2011), pp. 296-318.
2 For an explanation on the “anti-system” parties, see Giovanni SARTORI, Parties and Party Systems: 
A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
3 Erin K. Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment (Ithaca, New York, & 
London: Cornell University Press, 2007).
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S ers by Horowitz4 and Rabushka and Shepsle5, those parties of ethnic profile actually 
offer significant opportunities for interest articulation and demand channeling for 
those groups that would otherwise be marginalized by, secluded, or isolated from the 
party and political systems6. According to Arendt Lijphart, moderate ethnic parties 
are part and parcel of a working consociational democracy7. Ishiyama and Breuning’s 
interesting contribution8 in the sphere of the conceptualization and taxonomy of eth-
nic political formations argues that ethic parties can be distinguish among their “or-
ganizational identities, or how they present themselves to an electorate”, i.e. through 
their name or label: (1) “parties portraying themselves as representative of a particu-
lar group and including that group in the party’s name”, vs.(2) “parties that portray 
themselves in non-ethnic ways (by not including the group in its name)”, with the 
latter being able to attract supporters who display a considerable level of acceptance 
of democracy. This differentiation somehow annuls Kitschelt’s definition of an “eth-
nic party”, which is described as a political organization of limited appeal “to a par-
ticular ethnic or regional constituency and explicitly seek[ing] to draw boundaries’ 
between ethnic ‘friends’ and ‘foes’”9. The same holds true for Gunther and Diamond’s 
definition: “a purely ethnic party seeks only to mobilize the votes of its own ethnic 
group”10, and for Brass’s: “that one political organization dominant in representing 
the demands of the ethnic group against its rivals.”11 Horowitz’s definition resembles 
the “classical” direction, focused on party membership: “an ethnically based party is 
one that derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group and 
serves the interests of that group”12. Similar to this is the institutional definition of 
Lee van Cott: an ethnic party is that political formation “[…] authorized to compete 
in local or national elections; the majority of its leadership and membership identify 
4 Donald HOROWITZ, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press, 1985).
5 Alvin RABUSHKA and Kenneth SHEPSLE, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic 
Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972).
6 Johanna BIRNIR, Ethnicity and Electoral Politics (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007); Kanchan CHANDRA, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts 
in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
7 Arendt LIJPHART, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977). Lijphart’s famous distinction between “Westminster” 
(majoritarian) democracy and “consociational” democracy is instrumental in explaining the role of 
ethnic parties in two different democratic arrangements.
8 John ISHIYAMA and Marijke BREUNING, “What’s in a name? Ethnic party identity and democ-
ratic development in post-communist politics”, Party Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2 (March 2011), pp. 223-
241.
9 Herbert KITSCHELT, “Divergent Paths of Postcommunist Democracies”, in Larry DIAMOND and 
Richard GUNTHER (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), pp. 299-326.
10 Richard GUNTHER and Larry DIAMOND, “Species of Political Parties: A New Typology”, Party 
Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (March 2003), pp. 167-199 (p. 183).
11 Paul BRASS, Ethnicity and Nationalism (New Delhi, India: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 106.
12 Donald HOROWITZ, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 
2000), p. 291.
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themselves as belonging to a non-dominant ethnic group, and its electoral platform 
includes demands and programs of an ethnic or cultural nature.”13 Founded on pub-
lic display and representation, an ethnic party is defined by Chandra and Metz as “a 
party that overtly represents itself to the voters as the champion of the interests of 
one ethnic group or a set of groups to the exclusion of another or others, and makes 
such a representation central to its mobilizing strategy”14, doing so by “identifying the 
common ethnic enemy to be excluded”15. The taxonomy of ethnic parties is equally 
puzzling; Lieven de Winter16 discriminates among: (a) “moderate-protectionist” par-
ties, (b) “autonomist” parties, (c) “national-federalist” parties, and (d) “separatist” par-
ties (which, in turn, are of two sorts, (d.1) “the independence” parties, and (d.2) “the 
[purely] separatist” or “irredentist” parties). Sonia Alonso defines what she labels as a 
“ethno-nationalist party” that “party that pursue the maximalist political programme 
of independent statehood for the nation it claims to represent and ethnic homoge-
neity within the territory of this nation. This constitutes the ethnic party’s long-term 
political and policy programme, its raison d’être.”17 Famously, Alonso would prefer 
the distinction among: those ethnic parties operating in “ethno-national regions”, as 
opposed to those acting in “ordinary regions”, compellingly arguing that the differ-
ence in the setting the “ethno-national” parties advance their community’s demands 
generates a difference in the very raison d’être and methods of the parties.   
As a matter of fact, the Romanian Constitution, though defining the Romanian 
state as a “national” one, yet officially recognizes nineteen national minorities, which 
are entitled to parliamentary representation. Presently, eighteen minority groups (the 
Czechs and the Slovaks being represented as one) are represented in the lower cham-
ber of the Romanian Parliament. Surely, the most important minority group are the 
Hungarian (both numerically and politically) and the Roma (numerically) communi-
ties. The most vocal in pushing for broader minority rights’ protection, observance 
and promotion has constantly been the Hungarian one. The Hungarian minority con-
stitutes around 7% of the Romanian population, and it is territorially circumscribed to 
the counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mure, with sporadic communities all through-
out Transylvania and the Western extreme of Bacău county; the territory inhibited 
preponderantly by the Hungarian community and comprising the three counties is 
customarily known as “Székely Land”. Undoubtedly, the paramount portavoce for the 
demands of the Hungarian minority has been since 1990 an umbrella-organization 
13 Donna LEE van COTT, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America”, Latin Ameri-
can Politics and Society, Vol. 45, No. 2 (July 2003), pp. 1-39 (p. 3).
14 Kanchan CHANDRA and David METZ, “A New Cross-National Database on Ethnic Parties”, paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago (Illinois), 
April 24-27, 2002, pp. 1-28 (p. 5).
15 Kanchan CHANDRA, op. cit., p. 4.
16 Lieven de WINTER, “Conclusion: a Comparative Analysis of the Electoral Office and Policy Suc-
cess of Ethnoregionalist Parties”, in idem and Huri TÜRSAN (eds.), Regionalist Parties in Western 
Europe (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 204-247.
17 Sonia ALONSO, “Enduring Ethnicity: The Political Survival of Incumbent Ethnic Parties in West-
ern Democracies”, Estudio/ Working Paper No. 221/ 2005, pp. 1-29 (p. 4).
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S acting as a fully-fledged political party, the Democratic Union of the Hungarians in 
Romania (Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România – UDMR / Romániai 
Magyar Demokrata Szövetség – RMDSz). Functioning de facto as a political party on 
the post-communist Romanian political scene, UDMR/ RMDSz constitutes one of 
the most stable parties18, even though allowing internally for democracy and a con-
siderable degree of “back-bencher”-ism (e.g. the so-called “Reform Bloc”, functioning 
within the party in the period 2000-2003): it was part of the governing coalition in two 
out of five mandates (1996-2000; 2004-2008), with a third term supporting the gov-
ernment in Parliament, without being in the governing coalition (2000-2004). It has 
generally antagonized the successor party of the defunct regime, FSN/FDSN/PDSR/
PSD, being the governmental partner of rather right-wing, democratic coalitions. 
In the period 1991-2001, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania enjoyed 
95.8% support from the ethnic group they represented19; such overwhelming support 
is rarely prone to change, since ethnic identities are particularly rigid categories. Even 
so, during the last decade, the RMDSz/UDMR found itself challenged initially by the 
Civic Association for Oderheiu (UPE) – a conservative formation whose votes in the 
local elections of 2000 were annulled through a court order20 –, by the Hungarian 
Civic Union (MPSz; later to become the Hungarian Civic Party: Magyar Polgári Párt 
– MPP / Partidul Civic Maghiar – PCM)21 – a political formation initiated in 2004, 
with the full support of the defunct UPE, but unable to register as a political party due 
to the pressures – at the limits of legality. – of the dominant RMDSz/UDMR, running 
on the lists of the right-wing, non-ethnic Popular Action Party (PAP) instead –, by 
the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács – 
EMNT / Consiliul National Maghiar din Transilvania – CNMT) and by the Szekler 
National Council (Székely Nemzeti Tanács – SzNT / Consiliul National Secuiesc – 
CNS)22. Both of these parties were established in 2003, as splinters from the “Reform 
Bloc”, both equally vehement and radicalized by the hegemonic position of RMDSz/
UDMR and by what they perceived as the treason of the desideratum of territorial au-
tonomy. The general level of support towards RMDSz/UDMR has registered a subtle 
18 In this respect, Alonso argues that such a situation constitutes the normalcy: “[C]eteris paribus, et-
hnic parties should show lower fluctuation of votes, less electoral punishment, lengthier durations 
in office and less political erosion with the passage of time than class-based parties.” (op. cit., p. 8)
19 “Consolidation of democracy – Candidate countries barometer 1991-2001”, apud John ISHIYAMA 
and Marijke BREUNING, op. cit., p. 233.
20 See, for the controversial episode, Frigyes UDVARDY, “A romániai magyar kisebbség történeti kro-
nológiája 1990-2003” [“The historical chronology of the Hungarian minority in Romania”], Erdélyi 
Magyar Adatbank 1990-2010 [Transylvanian Hungarian Database], 2006.
21 Miklós BAKK, Zoltán Alpár SZÁSZ, and István Georgő SZÉKELY, “Parlamenti és elnökválasztás 
Romániában 2004 novemberében” [“Parliamentary and presidential elections in November 2004 in 
Romania”], Magyar Kisebbség [The Hungarian Minority], Vol. 9, No. 34 (2004), pp. 3-52 (p. 35).
22 Kinga MANDEL, “Az RMDSz oktatáspolitikája 1990-2003 között” [“The education politics of the 
RMDSz between 1990 and 2003”], in idem and Éva. BLÉNESI (eds.), Kisebbségek és kormánypoliti-
ka Közép-Európában (2002-2004) [Minorities and Government Politics in Central Europe (2002-
2004)] (Budapest, Hungary: Gondolat Kiadó-MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2004), 
pp. 85-107 (p. 97).
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decrease, due also to the decrease in the population of Hungarians in Romania. All 
these factors cumulated and it became increasingly difficult for the RMDSz/UDMR 
to overcome the 5% parliamentary threshold in 2012.  
For the Romanian case, in respect to its Hungarian minority, based on the meth-
odology provided by the document analysis method, the following four indicators in 
the EU conditionality framework were taken into consideration: (1) the use of minor-
ity language, (2) education in and of minority language, (3) cultural autonomy, and 
(4) territorial sub-national authority. The use of minority language was codified as 
follows: the minority language can only be used in private space – codified 1; the mi-
nority language can be used in order to guarantee human rights – codified 2; the mi-
nority language can additionally be used in professional life – codified 3; the minority 
language can additionally be used actively and passively with the state authorities at 
the local and regional levels – codified 4; and minority language is an official second 
state language – codified 5. Education in and of the minority language was thusly 
codified: no education of and in the minority language is provided and allowed by the 
state – codified 0; some education of the minority language is provided by the state 
– codified 1; the education in the minority language is additionally provided by the 
state up to the secondary level – codified 2; education of and in the minority language 
is additionally provided by the state up to the tertiary level – codified 3; the state es-
tablished and actively funds a separate university providing studies exclusively in the 
minority language – codified 4. Cultural autonomy – understood as “the capacity of 
a collectivity to choose ideas and modes of thought, to influence the forms in which 
meaning is externalized, and to steer how these forms are distributed”23 – was coded 
as rather cumulative indicators of the other three ones, and a more coherent, compre-
hensive dimensions of mere “individual (personal) autonomy”. That expressed a more 
liberal approach than a communitarian one with respect to minority rights, and is 
irrespective of the belonging of an individual to a certain national minority group; the 
presence in the scrutinized documents of the phrase “cultural autonomy” was coded 
as 1, whereas its absence was codified as 0. Territorial sub-national authority was 
coded through the following indicators: the existence of constitutionally designed 
unitary, centralized state – coded 1; the framing of successive stages of devolution, 
de-concentration, and functional and territorial decentralization – coded 2; the con-
stitutional existence of federalization – coded 3; the constitutional and physical frame 
consisting of an asymmetrical federalism on ethnic basis – coded 4; and the launching 
of a secessionist or irredentist projects and their successful accomplishment – cod-
ed 5. Paradoxically, a climate encouraging broader expressions of cultural autonomy 
leads almost immanently to segregation of the different ethnic groups encapsulated 
by a state, whereas a firm grip on issues revolving around the affirmation of the mi-
23 Ulf HANNERZ, Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 7. In Hannerz’s, culture is tri-dimensional: it encapsulates: (1) 
“ideas and modes of thought”, (2) “the externalization of meanings”, and (3) “the manner in which 
the inventory of meanings and meaningful forms are spread throughout a population”.
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S norities’ cultural autonomy can undoubtedly contribute significantly to the preser-
vation of national unity, to the national status-quo, to assimilation and integration of 
the national minority.
Demand Discrepancy: EU Reports vs. the RMDSz/UDMR
As soon as the democratic opposition accessed political power in 1996, the RMDSz/
UDMR advanced its constituency’s demand of employing Hungarian in public life, 
in dealing with the state authorities, in the relations of the minority with the public 
administration. Most local leaders in the three counties in which the Hungarians rep-
resent the majority of the inhabitants are of Hungarian origins, with the local bureau-
cracy being largely Hungarian. Consequently, in the region of Székelys, the Hungari-
an language was customarily used in the administration. Legally, with the Romanian 
state being constitutionally defined as a “national” one, the official language employed 
in the administration was, until 2001, Romanian. Pushing for a legal framework pro-
viding for the use of Hungarian in administration was not only de facto, but de jure as 
well. The RMDSz/UDMR obtained the adoption of the 2001 Law on Local Public Ad-
ministration, stipulating the employ of a minority language in public administration 
and in the citizens’ dealing with the authorities in the region in which the minority 
community is above 20%. However, while holding a say in the governmental affairs 
from 1996 to 2008, the RDMSz/UDMR has never advanced the proposition intro-
ducing Hungarian as a second state language, pragmatically envisaging the minimal, 
non-existent chances such a legislative proposal would garner.    
In all its programmatic documentation, almost without exception, the RMDSz/
UDMR expressed its community demands for the Romanian state to provide a broad-
er access to education in minority language at all levels, with a specific accent on the 
teaching of History and Geography in the mother tongue24. Due to its privileged posi-
tion in the government, in 1997, RMDSz/UDMR proposed and obtained the repealing 
24 Such a demand appears successively in: RMDSz/UDMR, “Az RMDSz programja” [“The prog-
ram of the RMDSz”], in RMDSz (eds.), Dokumentumok 5 [Documents 5] (Cluj-Napoca, 1997); 
idem, “Az RMDSz kormánykoaliciós cselekvési prioritásai” [“The Priorities of the RMDSZ in the 
government coalition”], in RMDSz (eds.), Dokumentumok 5 [Documents 5] (Cluj-Napoca, 1997); 
idem, “Az RMDSz programja” [“The program of the RMDSz”], in RMDSz (eds.), Dokumentumok 
7 [Documents 7] (Cluj-Napoca, 1999); idem, “Az RMDSz kormánykoaliciós cselekvési prioritásai” 
[“The Priorities of the RMDSz in the government coalition”], in RMDSz (eds.), Dokumentumok 7 
[Documents 7] (Cluj-Napoca, 1999); idem, “Milyen magyarságot akarunk? Milyen Erdélyt akarunk? 
Milyen Romániát akarunk? Választási program 2000” [“What Kind of a Hungarian Nation Do We 
Want? What Kind of Transylvania Do We Want? What Kind of Romania Do We Want? The Elec-
toral Program 2000”], 2000; idem, “Megállapodás a Szociáldemokrata Párt és a Romániai Magyar 
Demokrata Szövetség együttműködésére a 2003. évben” [“Agreement between the Social Democ-
ratic Party and the Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania in 2003”], 2003; idem, “A 
Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség VII. Kongresszusán elfogadott programja” [“The Program 
of the Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania, adopted at its 7th Congress”], 2003; idem, 
“Párbeszéd az autonomiáért. Az RMDSz választási programja” [“Dialogue for Autonomy. The Elec-
tion Program of the RMDSz”], 2004. 
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of the 1995 Law on Education which had represented the legal fundament for count-
less restrictions on the implementation of educational programmes in the minority 
languages. Cultural autonomy was equally demanded by the Hungarian community 
in Romania, and found thusly its expression in the programmes and governmental 
claims of RMDSz/UDMR. The employ of the mother tongue in administration and 
education is only a facet of cultural autonomy; the promotion of the specific culture, 
traditions and customs of a minority community belongs to the same sort of autono-
my. Jeffrey Alexander25 and Kane26 oppose “the sociology of culture” to “the cultural 
sociology”, arguing that the later is dependent on the existence of cultural autonomy 
per se, envisaged as a strong program in which “culture plays [a significant, determi-
nant role] in shaping social life”27. Postulating from the very beginning that “attempts 
to substitute cultural autonomy for territorial autonomy in contexts where territorial 
autonomy is feasible” should be rejected for the political integration of multinational 
polities, Rainer Bauböck distinguishes among three forms of CA [cultural autonomy]: 
“residual”, “supplementary”, and “transitional” arrangements of cultural autonomy. 
“Residual CA” is rather specific to most East-Central European legislations on minor-
ity rights, applying to those “groups that are geographically dispersed within or across 
territorial units and that are regarded as cultural minorities rather than constitutive 
peoples of the states where they live”28; residual CA is hence “little more than a com-
bination of the freedom of association and cultural practice with public recognition 
and support for historic minorities”, and sometimes some “local self-government in 
municipalities where they form a majority”. “Supplementary CA” often accompanies 
a general arrangement of TA [territorial autonomy], in those mixed regions, among 
usually two constitutive communities. Finally, “transitional CA” appears as a solution 
for those former communist multinational states in their attempt to avoid secession 
or irredentism, and to adopt a functioning integrationist liberal approach in the realm 
of minority rights in the absence of territorial autonomy: concretely, in order to avoid 
disintegration of the existing states. A rather “morally suspicious double standard” is 
employed, in which states facing multi-nationalism officially recognize the co-inhab-
iting minorities without granting them the right to self-determination. Outside the 
scholarly debates on the definition and proper conceptualization of “cultural autono-
my”, the European Commission presented a less straightforward, unclear perspective 
on the issue. In the specific case of the annual reports on the progress of Romania as 
25 Jeffrey C. ALEXANDER, “Action and Its Environments”, in Jeffrey C. ALEXANDER (ed.), Action 
and Its Environments. Toward a New Synthesis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 
301-333. 
26 Anne KANE, “Cultural Analysis in Historical Sociology: The Analytic and Concrete Forms of the 
Autonomy of Culture”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 53-69.
27 Jeffrey C. ALEXANDER and Philip SMITH, “The Strong Program in Cultural Theory: Elements of 
a Structural Hermeneutics”, in Jonathan H. TURNER (ed.), Handbook of Sociological Theory (New 
York: Springer Science+Business Media, 2001), pp. 135-150 (p. 137). 
28 Rainer BAUBÖCK, “Territorial or Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities?”, in Alain DIECK-
HOFF (ed.), The Politics of Belonging: Nationalism, Liberalism, and Pluralism (Lanham, Maryland: 
Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 221-257. 
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S a candidate-state, the problem of “cultural autonomy” is only rarely, sporadically and 
superfluously discussed. Whereas the RMDSz/UDMR pushed for “cultural autono-
my” under the form of the imperious necessity of the adoption of a Law on the Status 
of National Minorities, it could only bring forth its claims for “cultural autonomy” in 
the 2005 governmental program. Meanwhile, the European Commission transferred 
its satisfaction with the active and vocal presence of RMDSz/UDMR in government 
into the 2005 report on Romania, even through until that time it had overlooked the 
necessity of the ethnic party of the most populous minority of the country as part 
of the government. Additionally, it had never asked for the representation of a na-
tional minority in government or for active, coherent, comprehensive dialogue and 
cooperation between the government and the ethnic parties, for a suitable, fortunate 
expression of the claims and demands of the national minority groups. Equally, while 
RMDSz/UDMR constantly stressed the immense significance of territorial autonomy 
doubling the cultural one – what it referred to as “asymmetrical federalism on ethnic 
bases” – both the Romanian state and the European Commission failed to respond to 
such a claim. Territorial autonomy was never a valid coin for trade-offs in the calculus 
for governmental support; although much debated and hotly contested, the problem 
of “territorial autonomy” has been constantly rejected from the governmental agen-
da. One similarity is to be however encountered: both the engaged activity of the 
RMDSz/UDMR and the oversight of the European Commission through its annual 
monitoring acted as important and harsh reviewers of the much delayed process of 
administrative decentralization the Romanian state. One digression is welcome here 
in the present situation of heated debate on the reorganization of the Romanian ad-
ministration, on regionalization and decentralization, a discussion that was inaugu-
rated during the 2011 right-wing government and continued by the 2012 left-wing 
government; as observed in the Annexes below, all governmental projects envisaged 
thus far for the reorganization of the Romanian administrative units systematically 
neglected the legal formation of an already existing consistent and compressed, a 
territorially easily delineated region comprising Hungarian nationals. It is this au-
thor’s strong opinion that, in the initial phase of discussions on regionalization, the 
pressure of the Hungarian minority for the rethinking of the eight envisaged regions 
was to only include the three counties as a separate administrative entity. At the time 
of the first public debates on the issue of regionalization, RMDSz/UDMR continued 
to represent an important voice in the Parliament and to enjoy the recognition of its 
importance on the political scene by the governing party. Nevertheless, after the leg-
islative elections of 2012, when RMDSz/UDMR registered serious difficulties in over-
coming the electoral threshold of 5%, it still put forth the claim for a regionalization 
framework that would take into consideration Székely Land. However, both RMDSz/
UDMR and the European Commission remained the top observers and tough review-
ers of the fashion in which decentralization, regionalization, devolution is to proceed 
in the Romanian administration. In this respect, all annual reports on the progress 
of the Romanian state from 1997 to 2006 without exception argued in favor of finan-
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cial decentralization, of a proper, more transparent distribution of resources towards 
the regional and local levels29. However, quite importantly, as Szocsik remarkably ob-
serves, the European Commission “never linked its calls for decentralization with the 
issue of minority protection.”30                    
The Law on the Statute of National Minorities: the “hot potato” of the 
Romanian government. A look at the Venice Commission’s Opinion (2005)31 
A Law on the Statute of National Minorities remains another Achilles’ heel for Roma-
nia’s legislative development. The Law was called for by the ethic representation of 
the country – specifically, the Hungarian one – in the early 2000s, and a legislative 
project was drafted and forwarded to the Parliament in 2005. Yet in 2013, no Law on 
the Status of National Minorities is in force32. The “prehistory” of the 2005 legislative 
project is Law No. 86 for the Statute of Minority Nationalities, drafted by the Ministry 
29 European Commission, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Ac-
cession”, 1997, p. 13; idem, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards 
Accession”, 1998, p. 8; idem, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards 
Accession”, 1999, pp. 26, 63; idem, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress 
towards Accession”, 2000, pp. 16-17; idem,  “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s 
Progress towards Accession”, 2001, pp. 17, 19, 28; idem, “Regular Report from the Commission on 
Romania’s Progress towards Accession”, 2002, pp. 21, 24, 123, 134; idem, “Regular Report from the 
Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession”, 2003, p. 14; idem, “Regular Report from 
the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession”, 2004, pp. 17-18; idem, “Regular Report 
from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession”, 2005, pp. 8, 25; idem, “Regular 
Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession”, 2006, p. 5.
30 Edina SZÖCSIK, “The EU Accession Criteria in the Field of Minority Protection and the Demands 
of Ethnic Minority Parties”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 11, No. 2 
(2012), pp. 104-127 (p. 120).
31 For the complete trajectory of the legislative project on the status of national minorities in Ro-
mania and the complete text of the legislative draft, see http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.
proiect?idp=6778, last accessed: 01.10.2013.
32 Even though, in June 2013, in the context of discussions around the new revision of the Constitu-
tion, the Committee for the constitutional revision adopted an amendment proposed by RDMSz/
UDMR, as an addition to Article 6 of the Basic Law, reading: “The legal representatives of national 
minorities can establish, according to the law regarding the statute of national minorities [yet to be 
adopted], their own decision-making and executive bodies, with competences concerning the right 
to preserve, develop, and express their identity.” The amendment introduced “the right to freely 
use, including in the public space, their own national symbols, representing their ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity.” Another RDMSz/UDMR-proposed amendment was included in 
paragraph 3 of Art. 6: “The decisions of the central and local public authorities shall be taken only 
after the consultations of the citizens’ organizations pertaining to the national minorities, in respe-
ct to the preservation, development, and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity.” (National Press Agency AGERPRES, “Revizuirea Constituției: Minoritățile naționale își 
pot folosi în spațiu public și privat proriile simboluri” [“The Revision of the Constitution: National 
Minorities can use their own symbols both in the private and in the public spheres”], on the 13th 








S of Minority Nationalities, through Decree No. 309 of 6th of February 1945, a law that 
was never abrogated, though frequently breached and completely overlooked by the 
authorities of state socialism after 194833. More importantly, Law 86/1945, in its Art. 
8, provided for the legal observance of minority rights in administration in those ad-
ministrative units comprising 30% minority population. The “history” of the Law on 
the Status of National Minorities begins on the date 31st of August 2000, when the 
Minister for National Minorities Peter Eckstein-Kovács proposed and managed to 
adopt the renowned governmental Ordinance No. 137, concerning the prevention 
and combating of all forms of discrimination, but representing actually the first post-
1989 mentioning of collective rights for national minorities. The same drafter of the 
Ordinance, jurist Marko Attila, working as a State Secretary within the Department 
for Interethnic Relations, was the principal writer of the legislative project of the Law 
regarding the Status of National Minorities, a project finalized and assumed by 
Tăriceanu government in February 2005, and urgently sent to the Parliament, in May 
2005; it remains nevertheless trapped in the Senate which refused to debate it. Only 
in September was the project discussed in Committees, but on the 24th of October 
2005 the Senate rejected the project. Presently, the legislative project of the Law on 
the Statute of National Minorities is blocked in the committees of the Chambers of 
Deputies – in this matter, the decisional chamber –, which failed to prepare a com-
prehensive report on the project and to advance it for voting in the Lower Chamber 
of the Parliament. The problem is further complicated by the issuing of a mixed re-
view on the project, at the end of October 200534, by the Venice Commission (the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law). Although it praises the Roma-
nian government’s initiative to legislate in such a sensitive area, the Venice Commis-
sion requested some significant modification of the project under scrutiny: “The 
adoption of the current draft, if coupled with the necessary amendments to remedy 
the shortcomings highlighted hereafter, would certainly contribute to reinforcing Ro-
mania as a democratic state.” In 82 paragraphs, the Venice Commission’s opinion 
raised a multiplicity of problems with regard to the legislative project; among them, 
the most important refer to: (a) “[…] the question of the interrelation with other sec-
toral legislation remains unclear. This is largely due to the fact that the draft law has 
lost its original framework character […] by incorporating detailed regulations in key 
33 Many of its provisions are rather commonsensical, e.g. Art. 2: “The research on the ethnic origin of 
the Romanian citizens, with the scope of establishing their juridical situation, shall be forbidden.”; 
Art. 4: “[…] Any breaching, direct or indirect, of the citizens’ rights, or the reverse, the establish-
ment of privileges, direct or indirect, for citizens, on the basis of their race, religion, and nationality, 
as well as any promotion of exclusiveness or of race hatred and disregard of religion or nationality, 
shall be punishable by law.” (See, for the complete text of the Law No. 86/ 1945, http://www.legex.
ro/Legea-86-1945-83.aspx, last accessed: 06.10.2013).
34 The European Commission for Democracy through Law, “Report on the project of Law on the 
Status of National Minorities in Romania”, “Opinion No. 345/ 2005, CDL-AD 2005 026”, report pre-
sented and adopted at the Sixty-fourth Plenary Session of the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law, Venice, October 21-22, 2005 (and published in Strasbourg, on the 25th of October 
2005).
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sectors. In any case, the Commission is of the opinion that provisions of the Consti-
tution should not be repeated in the law, not even in an organic law [as it has been 
envisaged this piece of legislation to be]”35; (b) the Commission perceives the draft 
rather as a “lex specialis”, particularly in what concerns the “cultural autonomy” to be 
provided for by the Romanian state36; (c) probably, the most stressed-upon drawback 
of the legislative project is its conspicuous lack of correlation and coherence with the 
legislative corpus of the state (including the Law on Education, the Law of the Local 
Public Administration, etc.), deliberately conducive to dangerous levels of legal un-
certainty in relation with other pieces of legislation37; (d) the conceptual ambiguity of 
some parts of the draft is harshly reviewed by the Commission, for the project utilized 
in its text, sometimes interchangeably, notions and phrases such as “national minori-
ties”, “communities”, “national communities”38, intuitively leading to a reading of indi-
vidual rights of ethnically different as collective rights of ethnic groups; (e) yet anoth-
er problem is Art. 74 of the legislative draft, in that it advances an evidently closed 
enumeration of national minorities in Romania: “[t]his provision should be deleted; 
the interpretation and application of the general definition of article 3, paragraph 1 of 
the draft law should be left to the competent authorities and, ultimately, to the com-
petent courts. Should such a list be retained, it should be explicitly construed as 
non-exhaustive or indicative, not least of all because over time other communities 
may meet the elements of the definition.”39; (f ) the very definition of the collocation 
“national minority” appears problematic to the Commission, which points to a signif-
icant defining aspect: “the requirement that the community must have lived on the 
territory of Romania from the moment the modern Romanian state was established 
in order to qualify as a national minority […] [but it] seems to indicate that the rele-
vant time is 1919, although the creation of modern Romania may be seen as a process 
rather than a definite event”40. Cumulating, the Commission perceives the relation 
between the definition of “national minority” and the closed list of Art. 74 as an in-
consistent one and virtually incorrect: “[t]he consistency between the definition and 
the list is not at all evident [...], especially in the light of the comparison between the 
1992 and 2002 [and, more strikingly, 2011] census results made by the Government 
35 Ibidem, “C. Position of the draft law in the hierarchy of norms and in relation with other laws”, 
point 12, p. 4.
36 Ibidem, “C. Position of the draft law in the hierarchy of norms and in relation with other laws”, 
point 13, p. 4.
37 Ibidem, “C. Position of the draft law in the hierarchy of norms and in relation with other laws”, 
point 15, p. 4. The Venice Commission even suggests the construction of a list to the contained in 
the project including the pieces of legislation to be annulled with the adoption of the Law on the 
Statute of National Minorities.
38 Ibidem, “D. Personal scope of application”, “a. Issue of terminology”, point 16, p. 5. The references 
are in Arts. 49 and 74 of the legislative project.
39 Ibidem, “D. Personal scope of application”, “b. Definition of the term ‘national minority’”, point 21, 
p. 5.
40 Ibidem, “D. Personal scope of application”, “b. Definition of the term ‘national minority’”, point 20, 
p. 5.
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S […] [T]he list mentions some communities which were only to be found under the 
global heading in the 2002 census (e.g. the Albanians and the Macedonians), [it] also 
mentions the Italians which appeared as a specific category in the 2002 census but did 
not identify themselves as Italians in the 1992 census. Contrary to the Italians, the 
Csángós are not mentioned in the list even though they appeared as a specific catego-
ry in the 2002 census”41; (g) the legislative project tends to associate the rights re-
served to national minorities to their members’ quality of “citizens”, i.e. the condition 
of citizenship of the ethnically different in the ability of their groups to enjoy the 
rights traditionally reserved to minorities, except for political rights/political rep-
resentation; but the project extends this dependency to other sort of rights, with the 
Commission contending that “the same reasoning is less convincing as regards cul-
tural and educational rights, in particular because the text of the relevant constitu-
tional provisions contains no such explicit limitation”42. The recommendation is that 
Romania shall “not […] make citizenship an element of the definition of, but rather to 
indicate in the provisions concerned that the enjoyment of certain specific rights is 
restricted to citizens. Without such explicit restrictions, the assumption would be 
that the rights and facilities spelled out in the draft law are available both to citizens 
and non-citizens belonging to national minorities. [...] [T]he exclusion of non-citi-
zens – at least those belonging to a national minority recognized by the draft law – 
from the whole system of cultural autonomy is highly questionable.”43; (h) the Venice 
Commission observed the ambiguity transpiring from the project in respect to the 
right and the manner of using the mother tongue in the administrative units compris-
ing minorities: no exact percentage of minority population is established when grant-
ing such a right in the said units and no concrete manner in which this right is to be 
exerted are contained in the legislative draft: “The Commission is of the opinion that 
reserving the linguistic rights […] to citizens only and thereby not extending them to 
non-citizens can hardly be justified. […] Non-citizens may indeed speak certain mi-
nority languages which already enjoy the protection under the draft law.”44; (i) further 
clarifications concerning the report between “the individual” and “the community”: 
“A strong protection of the individual is indeed all the more required since important 
rights are granted to the community, in particular through the system of cultural au-
tonomy.”45 Significant concerns are raised regarding the dangerous and problematic 
41 Ibidem, “D. Personal scope of application”, “b. Definition of the term ‘national minority’”, point 22, 
p. 6.
42 Ibidem, “D. Personal scope of application”, “c. Citizenship criterion”, point 26, p. 6.
43 Ibidem, “D. Personal scope of application”, “c. Citizenship criterion”, point 27, p. 7. Neither Art. 
26 of the International Convention for the Civil and Political Rights nor Art. 21 of the Protocol of 
the European Convention of Human Rights require the strict differentiation between citizens and 
non-citizens in the enjoyment of universal rights. E.g. Art. 7 of the legislative project stipulates that 
the Romanian state shall take effective measures for the promotion of mutual respect, of unders-
tanding and cooperation among all Romanian citizens [not “persons”], with no difference of their 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity. 
44 Ibidem, “E. Public use of minority languages”, points 35-36, pp. 8-9.
45 Ibidem, “F. Judicial protection of the rights enshrined in the draft law”, points 37-39, p. 9.
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prevalence of collective rights the legislative draft intrinsically favors, to the detri-
ment of the centrality of individual rights. (j) The Venice Commission refers critically 
to Law no. 67 of 2004 that simply excludes the organizations of those minority groups 
that are not represented in the Parliament and in the Council for National Minorities: 
these ethnic groups are unable, according to the law46, to claim representation even at 
the local or regional level, in the circumstances in which they represent below 10% of 
the population in one administrative unit: “[T]he Commission is still of the opinion 
that a 10% threshold of this type would be too restrictive a condition. This is especial-
ly the case for those organizations which operate at the local level in administrative 
units where there is a concentration of members of the minority concerned, but 
which cannot meet the requirement of 10% at the national level. […] [T]he Commis-
sion is of the opinion that the conditions for registration may be of such a severity that 
they disproportionately favor groups which are represented in parliament to the dis-
advantage of new groups which wish to participate in public life. This is all the more 
problematic since electoral privileges are not the only element at stake. Indeed, in 
addition to participation in elections, the qualification as entails several competences 
listed in Art. 40 of the draft law. These competences include the right to be represent-
ed in the Council of National Minorities, the right to administer special funds and 
receive yearly allowances from the State budget, the right to propose the appointment 
of representatives in certain institutions and to notify the National Council for Com-
bating Discrimination of cases of discrimination. […] [T]he organizations of citizens 
belonging to national minorities are associations and the conditions they required to 
fulfill to be registered have to be analyzed as restrictions to the freedom of associa-
tion.”47; (k) While mentioning the virtues of Law no. 86/1945, the Commission ex-
pressed serious concerns in respect to the safeguards on the protection of personal 
data of individuals belonging to national minorities: such safeguards are neglected by 
the Arts. 4, 13, 40, 42, and 62 of the legislative project, and they further contravene 
Art. 3 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, that 
stipulates the sine qua non condition for legislative acts in this sphere are to include 
the optional exposure of the personal data of the ethnically different; (l) one of the 
most significant criticisms of the Venice Commission refers to the very concept of 
“cultural autonomy”, present in the Chapter V of the legislative project, which would 
suggest the granting of collective rights for national minorities: “The Commission 
notes that there is no internationally accepted model of cultural autonomy for nation-
al minorities. […] Chapter V of the draft law implements what could be described as 
the collective dimension of the protection granted to national minorities. Indeed, the 
main feature of a system of cultural autonomy is that it goes beyond the mere recog-
nition of rights for persons belonging to national minorities. This is reflected in Art. 
57, paragraph 1 of the draft, which defines cultural autonomy as the right of a nation-
46 More specifically, Law no. 67 of 2004.
47 Ibidem, “G. Participation”, “b. Organisations of citizens belonging to national minorities”, “aa. Con-
ditions for registration”, points 46-48, 49-50, pp. 11-12.
MARIN, ROXANA




S al community to have decisional powers in matters regarding its cultural, linguistic 
and religious identity, through councils appointed by its members.”48 For the Com-
mission, it becomes of paramount importance for the legislative draft to properly and 
clearly discriminate between “the rights of persons belonging to national minorities” 
(stipulated under Chapters I and II) and “collective rights of the national-ethnic 
groups” (hinted to in the Chapter V). A further problematic aspect is, in the Commis-
sion’s perspective, the superposing, overlapping of the attributions and competences 
of the institutions of cultural autonomy and those of the already existing institutions 
functioning at the local level, due to the lack of clarity and coherence in the text of the 
legislative project49: in this sense, the ambiguity of competences of the envisaged and 
existing institutions “makes it extremely difficult to identify the main rules governing 
the relationship – including from a budgetary perspective – with the public authori-
ties.     
Concluding remarks
In the sphere of minority rights of using the language in public administration and 
professional life, the European Commission was overtly undecided. Clearly, the EC 
Annual Reports repeatedly reviewed favorably the efforts of the Romanian candi-
date-state to adopt a new piece of legislation allowing for the use of minority languag-
es in public life50. When the improved Law on Public Administration was adopted, 
the European Commission marked the event in its 2002 report, stressing the success 
registered by the candidate state in the field of minority rights’ protection51. Surely, 
the report of 1997 positively reviewed the repealing of the 1995 Law on Education, 
but it failed to advance further steps after the abolishment of the said legislation. 
Instead, in the 1998 report, the European Commission mentioned sporadically the 
importance of education in Hungarian at the tertiary level52. Subsequently and gradu-
ally, in 1999, 2000 and 2001 reports, the Commission reminded the Romanian state of 
the significance of the future establishment of a multicultural, multilingual university 
– a project initially envisaged by the RMDSz/UDMR –; the 2001 report even criti-
cized to some extent the inability of the Romanian state to fund such an educational 
establishment. Quite surprisingly and unexpectedly, the problem of the Hungarian 
university was suddenly dropped, immediately after Sapientia University, a private 
48 Ibidem, “G. Participation”, “d. Cultural autonomy”, point 58, pp. 13-14, and [G.d.] “aa. Group rights 
and binding consent”, point 60, p. 14.
49 Ibidem, “G. Participation”, “d. Cultural autonomy”, “bb. Relationship between institutions of cultural 
autonomies and other bodies”, point 67, pp. 15-16.
50 See, for instance European Commission, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Prog-
ress towards Accession”, 1999, p. 19, and idem, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s 
Progress towards Accession”, 2001, p. 29.
51 European Commission, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards 
Accession”, 2002, p. 35.
52 European Commission, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards 
Accession”, 1998, p. 11.
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exclusively Hungarian university, was founded in Cluj, in 2001, with the financial as-
sistance of the Hungarian state. The establishment of Sapientia University seemed 
to complete the conditionality of the Commission. Three years after, the EC report 
of 2004 wrote about another success of the Romanian government in the sphere of 
minority rights’ protection and promotion, i.e. the introduction of new programmes 
in Hungarian at two faculties at the state university Babes-Bolyai in Cluj53. It can be 
therefore observed that the Commission expressed a certain degree of concern in re-
spect to the candidate state’s legal development in the field of minority rights – with 
a special emphasis on the Hungarian community –, without actually putting forward 
a certain, clear-cut position in the field of Hungarians’ right to use their language 
in education at secondary and tertiary levels. The Commission failed in assuming 
“an assertive stance”54: “[s]ometimes it criticized the current situation, while other 
times it praised ongoing efforts, and was unassertive on the institutional solution of 
education in Hungarian [in Romania].”55 Subsequently, it appears that the salience of 
an issue in the monitoring of the observance, protection, and promotion of minority 
rights, and its actual presence in the European Commission’s Regular Reports on the 
Progress of Romania, as a candidate-state to the adherence to the Union, are highly 
dependent on the political factors and on the evolution of some specific topics on the 
internal political scene. By “political factors”, this paper isolates such aspects like: the 
presence in the governing coalitions of the RMDSz/UDMR; the depth and the status 
of discussions, the negotiations on one of the four indicators presented above by the 
Romanian legislators; the actual situation and gradual improvements registered on 
one of these indicators in decision-making internally or externally (e.g. with the sup-
port of the Hungarian government), etc. The Reports appear sporadic in their treat-
ment of minority rights on the four isolated indicators, with significant differences 
in the space reserved to these issues in the texts of subsequent reports: oftentimes, 
stringent aspects, in respect to minority rights, dealt with in a detailed fashion in one 
report, are completely put aside in the following report, even in the circumstances in 
which the aspects under scrutiny were not exhaustively discussed and resolved by the 
Romanian decision-makers. The debates occasioned by the drafting of the legislative 
project on the Law on the Status of National Minorities, the difficulties raised by 
the delays in adopting the said project, the issuing of a mixed, controversial opinion 
from the Venice Commission detailed above, were all not even mentioned in the EC 
reports of 2005 and 2006. Strangely enough, although it has previously referred to 
the necessity of a piece of legislation in the realm of the statute of national minorities 
in Romania, the European Commission remained silent on the report of the Ven-
ice Commission. It remained equally silent on the constant, consistent demands of 
RMDSz/UDMR for cultural autonomy for the Hungarian minority, though it declar-
53 European Commission, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards 
Accession”, 2004, p. 30.
54 Edina SZÖCSIK, op. cit., p. 119.
55 Ibidem.
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S atively admired the proactive, vigorous attitude of the Democratic Union of Hungar-
ians in Romania. From the dynamics of the issue of minority rights in the EC reports, 
it appears that the mentioning of the problems the ethnic groups confronted with in 
Romania has been political opportune. Subsequently, the EU conditionality has been 
largely incongruent with the active and always growing claims of RMDSz/UDMR, 
for the simple fact that the aims of the two political entities significantly differed: the 
scope of the EU conditionality in the field of minority rights was “the stabilization 
of ethnically divided states, based on the premises that guaranteeing minority rights 
and ensuring political inclusion of ethnic minorities would prevent ethnic conflict”, 
whereas the prime scope of the RMDSz/UDMR – otherwise, of domestic minority 
parties generally –, is to promote and protect the political and the cultural distinctive-
ness of the represented group(s).    
In the Report of 1998, the issue of minority rights is circumscribed to the general 
protection of human rights: a special sub-section is reserved for the topic, in which 
the level of protection of minorities in Romania is evaluated as “satisfactory, with the 
major exception of the Roma”, with a series of developments being highlighted: [a] “a 
continued debate on the proposed amendments to the 1995 Education Act, which 
aim to establish the legal basis for setting up a Hungarian language University. […] a 
political modus vivendi has been achieved which will allow for the establishment of 
a multi-cultural Hungarian-German university”; [b] “an Inter-ministerial Committee 
for National Minorities was set up by a government decision in August 1998”. The 
recommendations refer extensively to the Roma minority, with the general suggestion 
that the “Government Department for Minorities should be strengthened in term 
of staffing and financial resources.”56 In 1999, the treatment of minority protection 
in the EC Report is similar; about two pages are dedicated to the topic, emphasis is 
given to the Roma minority, while it is suggested that the “conditions for use of mi-
nority languages, in particular Hungarian, have improved. In July, 1999 both cham-
bers of Parliament adopted the final version of the new Education Law which created 
the legal framework for establishing multi-cultural universities and gives the right 
to the national minorities to study in their mother tongue at all levels and forms of 
education for which there is a sufficient demand.” On the other hand, it pointed to 
the failure of the Romanian state to implement the effects of the recently adopted 
law for university studies in minority languages: “While this in general will improve 
the possibilities for receiving education in minority languages, the establishment of 
a specific public university with teaching in Romanian, Hungarian, and German (Pe-
tofi-Schiller) remains controversial. The legal basis for its establishment has still to be 
completed.”57 “Controversial” is rather an understatement, even with the support of 
the right-wing, democratic government at that time in power in Romania: “In June 
56 European Commission, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards 
Accession”, 1998, pp. 11-12.
57 European Commission, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards 
Accession”, 1999, p. 18 [italics added].
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1999 the Government signed an agreement with Hungary providing for an increase 
of the number of lectures taught in Hungarian as well as an increase in the number 
of exchange students [with Hungarian universities]. In addition the new law of local 
administration stipulates that civil servants working directly with the public must 
speak the language of an ethnic minority in areas where the minority represents at 
least 20% of the population. In this context, the Government Ordinance of June 1999 
regarding the restitution of properties belonging to the national minorities is also a 
positive development.”58 The report of November 2000 is more superfluous on the 
topic – intrinsically indicating the slow, but sure, progress the Romanian state has 
registered –, but the focus remained overwhelmingly on the Roma problématique 
and on the unsubstantial commitment of the Romanian government in this sphere. 
Conversely, the European Commission welcomed the active policy of the government 
in the protection of the use of minority languages, particularly in the educational sys-
tem: “[N]ational minorities now have the right to education in their mother tongue 
at all levels of education. The history and traditions of each minority group have been 
incorporated into the curricula and instruction materials and free textbooks have 
been provided for compulsory education. At present, 5% of educational units teach 
in a minority language. In the vast majority of cases this is Hungarian, although six 
other languages are also used. A number of pupils from linguistic minorities who at-
tend schools teaching in Romanian are also offered the possibility of studying in their 
mother tongue. In such cases a total of 15 minority languages are taught.”59
From the comparative analysis of the annual regular reports on Romania’s pro-
gress towards accession issued by the European Commission in the period 1998-
2006, on the one hand, and the RMDSz/UDMR’s documentation (including party 
programmes, the statute of the organizations, and other resembling materials issued 
by the party leadership), it has resulted in a stringent and conspicuous lack of con-
gruence between the two collections of documents, indicating a discrepancy between 
the European Commission’s conditionality on Romania and the desiderata, the claims 
and the demands of the most vocal minority political organization in the country, on 
the topic of minority rights’ observance, protection and promotion, particularly on 
the status of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Consequently, it appears that, even 
though declaratively, the European framework is set to observe the promotion of mi-
nority rights within the states of the Union, in practice it can hardly match the claims 
and demands “on the ground”, in the minority communities.
58 Ibidem, p. 19.
59 European Commission, “Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards 
Accession”, 2000, pp. 24.
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The no. of votes The proportion of 
mandates in the Parliament





The Senate The Chamber 
of Deputies
The Senate
1990 7.23% 7.2% 7.32% 10.08% opposition
1992 7.46% 7.58% 8.23% 8.39% opposition
1996 6.64% 6.82% 7.29% 7.69% government
2000 6.8% 6.9% 7.83% 8.57% opposition, but 
supporting the 
government
2004 6.2% 6.2% 6.62% 7.3% government
2008 6.17% 6.39% 6.59% 6.56% opposition, but in 
government in 2009-2011
2012  5.15% 5.25% 4.37% 5.11% opposition
(Source: The Results of the Romanian Elections 1990-2012 [Date electorale românești], 
University “Babes-Bolyai” of Cluj, http://www.polito.ubbcluj.ro/romanianelectoral-
data/ro/rezultatele-alegerilor-%C3%AEn-rom%C3%A2nia, last accessed: 01.10.2013) 
2. Document Analysis: The presence of the four selected indicators in the docu-
mentation used
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y 0 0 - - 1* 0 0 1 0 
(1)**
















y - - - 2 2 - 2 2 2
* Although the phrase “cultural autonomy” is not to be encountered in the 2002 EC 
Report, the document does refer to the free “use of the national flag, anthem and 
coat of arms, in order to allow national minorities to use their own symbols at official 
gatherings.” (p. 35) 
** The collocation “cultural autonomy” does not appear in the text of the “Commu-
nication from the Commission. Monitoring Report on the state of Preparedness for 
EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania” (September 2006), but the report includes 
the indication: “In the field of protection of minorities, only limited progress can be 
reported. The draft law on the statute of national minorities and setting up the princi-
ples of equality and non-discrimination and multiculturalism, is still being discussed 
in parliament. This legislative process needs to be followed closely.” (p. 40) The Com-
mission Staff’s Working Document on Romania, titled “Monitoring Report Romania” 
(May 2006), does not include any reference to “cultural autonomy”, not even to the 
Hungarian minority per se.
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